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Abstract  
 I undertake a discourse analysis of World Bank documents from 1995 to the present to 
explore scholarly debates surrounding the question, “To what extent are the World Bank’s efforts 
to combat corruption evidence of its attempts to further the neoliberal agenda, characterized by 
the original Washington Consensus?”  Since the late 1990’s, the World Bank has been a leader in 
the fight against corruption, integrating anti-corruption into its operations worldwide and making 
it a major issue addressed in World Development Reports, Presidential speeches, and specific 
anti-corruption strategies.  While some scholars see this as an evolutionary move away from 
neoliberalism, others see the focus on corruption as a way for the Bank to continue to advance 
and expand the neoliberal agenda after the failure of structural adjustment programs.  I argue that 
while the World Bank’s anti-corruption strategy featured distinctly neoliberal ideals in its early 
years, over time it has moved away from a focus on liberalization and competition to a more 
holistic focus on transparency and civic participation as pillars of good governance. 
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Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, the global development community has increasingly come to 
believe that corruption inhibits growth, slows development, and often harms the poor 
disproportionately.  The focus on corruption manifests itself in numerous ways.  International 
organizations like the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have declarations against corruption, economists produce countless 
econometric studies modeling the relationship between corruption and growth, anti-corruption 
NGOs like Transparency International have been established and wield a great deal of influence, 
and major players in development have incorporated anti-corruption strategies into their 
operations.  The World Bank in particular has become a key player in the anti-corruption 
movement.  In 1998, World Bank President James Wolfensohn famously declared that the Bank 
was prepared to tackle the “cancer of corruption,” propelling the World Bank into the struggle 
against corruption in country operations, in its research, and in the international discourse on 
corruption.   
 This paper seeks to investigate the question, “To what extent are the World Bank’s 
efforts to combat corruption evidence of its attempts to further the neoliberal agenda, 
characterized by the original Washington Consensus?”  Scholars including Harrison, Szeftel, 
Brown and Cloke, and Polzer who critique the international discourse on corruption claim that it 
is an effort by international organizations like the World Bank to further the neoliberal agenda as 
embodied by the Washington Consensus.
1
  However, the World Bank’s anti-corruption strategy 
currently focuses broadly on a combination of increasing government transparency and civic 
                                                 
1
 Meier summarizes the ten reforms of the original Washington Consensus as “(1) fiscal discipline, (2) public 
expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) liberalization of financial markets, (5) competitive exchange rate, (6) 
liberalization of trade policy, (7) foreign direct investment, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) property 
rights.” Biography of a Subject 92. 
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participation.  Such a strategy does not obviously advance the neoliberal agenda, but whether it 
truly signals a shift away from neoliberalism or merely disguises neoliberal ideals to escape 
criticism is unclear.  Furthermore, the broader discourse on corruption includes numerous 
alternative solutions to transparency and civic participation that definitively advance the 
neoliberal agenda such as reducing the discretionary powers of the state and increasing openness 
to trade to reduce corruption through global competition.  That the Bank is not exploiting such 
obviously neoliberal solutions suggests that it may be moving away from the neoliberal agenda. 
It is important to address anti-corruption solutions in the broader context of the 
development discourse because recognizing the ideologies and motives shaping the actions of 
major development agencies like the World Bank is critical in evaluating their legitimacy.  
Ideally, development institutions should be highly dynamic entities that enact policy shifts based 
on new evidence, so assessing the extent to which a major player in development like the World 
Bank is pursuing a single ideology rather than responding to new information is vital to 
determining its legitimacy and potential effectiveness.  Therefore, the research is important 
because it attempts to objectively assess the Bank’s agenda.  More broadly, corruption has 
become a major focus in development, so it is important to recognize hidden agendas in the anti-
corruption movement and to distinguish such agendas from results-driven policies striving to 
curb corruption in an attempt to foster economic growth and development.  
I argue that the World Bank’s discourse on corruption has changed significantly over 
time, signaling a shift away from the neoliberal agenda.  Furthermore, although transparency and 
civic participation are considered manifestations of the neoliberal discourse by some scholars, 
the Bank’s use of them has evolved over time from employing them solely as tools to promote 
efficiency, accountability, and competition to recognizing them as elements to be pursued as 
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critical components of good governance, which according to recent Bank definitions includes, 
“the form or nature of the political regime; the processes by which authority is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic or social resources; and the capacity of government to 
design, formulate, and implement policy and deliver goods and services.”2  Given that this notion 
of good governance goes well beyond simple notions of accountability, efficiency, and 
competition, an approach that uses transparency and civic participation as pieces of a broader 
governance agenda indicates a move away from neoliberal principles and ideals. 
Literature Review 
Scholars critiquing the international discourse on corruption agree that the neoliberal 
agenda is the driving force behind the discourse on the nature, causes, consequences, and 
solutions to corruption.  Opposing them are scholars who argue that the development discourse, 
and with it World Bank policies and practices, have evolved over time from an exclusive focus 
on the policies embodied in the Washington Consensus to a recognition of the critical role states 
and institutions play in development.  Situated between these two extremes are those who have 
observed the shift in World Bank policies from the Washington Consensus to “getting 
institutions right”, but who argue that the post-Washington Consensus merely broadens the 
objectives of the neoliberal agenda as well as the tools that can be used to achieve it.  These 
scholars exhibit many similarities with those critiquing the discourse on corruption, but their 
arguments differ slightly and their methodology tends to focus less on deconstructing the 
discourse.  Despite the wide range of views represented in these three schools of thought, 
significant gaps remain in their analyses. 
                                                 
2
 World Bank, “Strengthening Governance: Tackling Corruption: The World Bank Group’s Updated Strategy and 
Implementation Plan.” (2012): p. 9. 
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In arguing that neoliberal interests have or have not shaped the international discourse on 
corruption, few scholars have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of World Bank literature 
despite the frequency with which it is identified as one of the most neoliberal-leaning 
international organizations as well as a leader in the fight against corruption.  Of the few who 
have, none have engaged with the full range of arguments concerning the extent to which the 
Bank’s discourse on corruption furthers the neoliberal agenda.  Therefore, my contribution lies in 
undertaking an updated analysis of World Bank literature in the context of the three schools of 
thought identified here. 
Corruption as a means to further the neoliberal agenda 
 Typically, scholars critiquing the discourse on corruption frame it within the context of 
structural adjustment and its failure to create economic growth in numerous countries by the 
early 1990s.  In need of an explanation for the failure of structural adjustment, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) focused on excessive state intervention as the cause 
of corruption, concurrently explaining the failure of structural adjustment by blaming states and 
identifying a new area for action.  As Szeftel, Brown and Cloke, Bedirhanoğlu, and Polzer point 
out, corruption allowed states, rather than failed development policies, to be the unit in need of 
reform.
3
 Polzer argues, “the neoliberal paradigm was ultimately protected by shifting attention 
from international systemic factors, such as ‘adverse conditions, unfair markets, or inappropriate 
economic reforms,’ to the local ‘lack of proper institutional capacity to manage the necessary 
process of adjustment.’”4  Harrison adds that the anti-corruption discourse became a method of 
                                                 
3
 Morris Szeftel, “Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda,” Review of African 
Political Economy 25, 76 (1998): 234. 
Ed Brown and Jonathan Cloke, “Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: Assessing the 
International Anti-Corruption Crusade,” Antipode 36, 2 (2004): 287. 
Tara Polzer, “Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse,” London School of Economics Development 
Studies Institute Working Papers Series (2001): 187. 
4
 Polzer 8. 
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normalization, as it attempted to restore the prominence of neoliberalism by modeling all states 
on the West where neoliberalism originated.
5
   
 The critique of the corruption discourse as a tool to advance the neoliberal agenda 
typically rests on the construction of corruption as an economic phenomenon.  Szeftel, Harrison, 
and Polzer call attention to the reality that corruption only became objectionable when it 
appeared that it was imposing severe economic costs, at which point the World Bank portrayed it 
as an economic issue in order to bring it within the non-political mandate of the Bank.
6
  
Bukovansky makes a similar argument, pointing out that the goal continues to be a singular focus 
on economic growth, but, “How the means to attain that goal are conceptualized has broadened 
to include such things as institutions, ‘governance’, ‘human capital’, and ‘social capital’.”7  Thus, 
the centrality of corruption as an impediment to economic growth and anti-corruption strategies 
as a means to foster economic growth, rather than forming their own ends of good governance, 
form the basis for the critique of the corruption discourse.
8
  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
regardless of the neoliberal tendencies of the World Bank agenda, the Bank’s mandate 
necessitates that corruption be constructed as an economic issue.  To the extent that scholars 
argue that Bank involvement in anti-corruption efforts is inappropriate as a whole, their 
argument remains internally consistent; however, the critique becomes contradictory when 
scholars affirm the importance of addressing corruption in Bank operations but criticize the focus 
on economics. 
                                                 
5
 Elizabeth Harrison, “Corruption,” Development in Practice 17, 4/5 (2007): 673. 
Morris Szeftel, “Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda,” Review of African 
Political Economy 25, 76 (1998): 675. 
6
 Szeftel 25. 
Harrison 676. 
Polzer 10. 
7
 Mlada Bukovansky, “The hollowness of anti-corruption discourse,” Review of International Political Economy 13, 
2 (2006): 185. 
8
 Jeff Everett, Dean Neu, and Abu Shiraz Rahaman, “The Global Fight Against Corruption: A Foucaultian, Virtues-
Ethics Framing,” Journal of Business Ethics 65 (2006): 7. 
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 While understanding the basis of the scholarly critique is critical, it is also essential to go 
beyond understanding its underpinnings to addressing why corruption as an economic 
phenomenon is harmful.  At a basic level, Everett, et al, argue that economics is, “a discipline 
that by definition ceases concerns with moral obligations and concerns about the other,” thereby 
removing moral considerations from the discourse on corruption completely.
9
  However, 
scholars including Bukovansky, Brown and Cloke, and Polzer see the economics-centric 
discourse as a way to construct morality in ways that allow developed countries to claim moral 
high ground without justification by equating “developing” with “corrupt” and “developed” with 
“not corrupt”, thus using an economic notion of corruption to “other” less developed countries.10  
Compounding the harmful effects of “othering” is the notion that using an economic definition of 
corruption deprives people in less developed countries of their agency in defining corruption for 
themselves while ignoring historical contributions to corruption through processes of 
colonization and inequitable or exploitative trade relations.
11
  As Schmitz argues, “the ingenious 
message boils down to trusting in Western benevolence and superior knowledge. Then, and only 
then, can one make allowances for adaptations appropriate for local conditions.”12  Equating 
control of corruption with economic success not only places developed countries on the moral 
high ground, it also places them in dominant positions to shape anti-corruption policies that are 
non-contextualized.  Bukovansky points out that this is problematic because, “where 
[institutions] are most legitimate, their norms have been internalized by those who believe in 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Bukovansky 198. 
Brown and Cloke 280. 
Polzer 11. 
11
 Bukovansky 198. 
Brown and Cloke 280. 
12
 G.J. Schmitz, “Democratization and Demystification: Deconstructing ‘Governance’ as Development Paradigm,” 
in Moore, David B. and Schmitz, Gerald J., (eds.) 1995 Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular 
Pracitces (London: Macmillan Press), in Polzer: 12. 
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their legitimacy and who allow their actions to be guided by such norms not out of fear of 
punishment but rather out of belief in their veracity.”13  Without country buy-in, Western, 
neoliberal anti-corruption policies are unlikely to work, thereby perpetuating the problem. 
 Discourse scholars also find the construction of corruption as an economic issue troubling 
because they see the governance agenda as synonymous with the neoliberal agenda.
14
  The 
World Bank claimed to have been addressing corruption for years using the neoliberal agenda, as 
market distortions created by state intervention provided opportunities for corruption and the 
neoliberal agenda endeavored to remove such distortions.
15
  However, as Polzer highlights, it is 
unclear why the Bank promoted an increased interest in corruption in the late 1990s if the 
neoliberal agenda was already addressing the problem.
16
  Such contradictions make scholars 
suspicious.  Polzer, Bedirhanoğlu, and Brown and Cloke see the Bank’s anti-corruption measures 
as a way to continue its neoliberal practice of removing power from the state and using 
knowledge as a way to exercise control over developing countries.
17
  This concurrently ignores 
non-economic forms of corruption and the potential for “good economic policies”, meaning 
neoliberal policies, to contribute to corruption, leaving the use of corruption as a means to gain 
political power as well as opportunities for corruption arising from deregulation completely 
unaddressed.
18
 
 While such critiques should certainly be taken seriously, there are a number of 
limitations.  For one, Polzer is the only scholar to acknowledge that while the World Bank has 
                                                 
13
 Bukovansky 199. 
14
 Harrison 675. 
15
 Brown and Cloke 286. 
16
 Polzer 14. 
17
 Polzer 4. 
Pinar Bedirhanoğlu, “The Neoliberal Discourse on Corruption as a Means of Consent Building: reflections from 
post-crisis Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 28, 7 (2007): 1241. 
Brown and Cloke 276. 
18
 Polzer 16. 
Szeftel 233. 
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been central in shaping the corruption discourse, the discourse has also played a significant role 
in shaping the Bank.
19
  Directly addressing corruption placed the credibility of the World Bank at 
risk and forced it to change its conceptions of development priorities.  Those changes have not 
been widely acknowledged in the critique of the Bank’s practices. Rather, scholars have tended 
to treat the Bank as a non-dynamic institution with constant interests.  Scholars who deconstruct 
the World Bank’s discourse on corruption only use documents from the early years of the Bank’s 
operationalization of corruption, at which time the Bank as a whole maintained a strong 
neoliberal stance.  By assessing the Bank’s discourse on corruption over a more extensive period 
of time, I will be able to assess the validity of the non-dynamic conception of the Bank, enabling 
me to extend and update the work of scholars like Bukovansky and Polzer.  Finally, Everett, et 
al, using a similarly limited sample of documents, argue that the World Bank favors “exit 
strategies” for reducing corruption, or strategies designed to increase competition, as opposed to 
strategies increasing civic participation and voice.
20
  My findings largely contradict their 
assessment, so I will engage with their argument directly using more updated documents from 
the World Bank. 
The New Development Economics: Anti-corruption as an Evolution of World Bank policy 
 Scholars who view the discourse on corruption as an evolution of development 
economics see the focus on governance and anti-corruption as a move from the Orthodox 
reaction that resulted in the Washington Consensus and structural adjustment to a focus on what 
governments can do best to make states more efficient.
21
  Rodrik states, “It’s fair to say that no 
                                                 
19
 Polzer 5. 
20
 Everett, et al 5. 
21
 Gerald M. Meier, Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005), 93. 
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one really believes in the Washington Consensus anymore.”22 He argues that there is now a 
consensus around the necessity of strong institutions including property rights, the rule of law, 
macroeconomic stability, and civic representation.
23
  Scholars like Meier and Fine agree, also 
acknowledging that the focus on corruption represents an attempt to highlight and understand the 
importance of institutions and mechanisms for getting institutions right.
24
 
 The movement toward institution-building and away from the Orthodox reaction has 
been termed “the new development economics”.25  It is characterized by the use of governments 
to shape incentives in private markets and an emphasis on civic engagement as a crucial tool for 
building strong institutions that allow economies to thrive.
26
   Scholars arguing for the new 
development economics insist that nations cannot take advantage of opportunities in the 
international market without strong institutional support, rendering institutions as important as 
open and competitive markets.
27
  As Rodrik argues, “Market or government forces that affect 
accumulation or productivity changes are much more costly, and hence more deserving of policy 
attention, than distortions that simply affect static resource allocation.”28  Put otherwise, while 
the neoliberal agenda focuses exclusively on correcting distortions in markets by moving them 
closer to perfect competition, the new development economics also focuses on government 
policies that affect pre-market portions of the production process.    
                                                 
22
 Dani Rodrik and World Bank, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the 
World Bank’s ‘Economics Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,’” Journal of Economic 
Literature 44, no. 4 (2006): 974. 
23
 Dani Rodrik One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 184. 
24
 Meier 125. 
Ben Fine, “Introduction: The Economics of Development and the Development of Economics,” in The New 
Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus. Jomo K.S. and Ben Fine (eds.) (Shahpur Jat: Tulika 
Books, 2006), xviii. 
25
 Meier 125. 
26
 Meier 126, 136. 
27
 Meier 150. 
28
 Rodrik and World Bank 976. 
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 Scholars in this school of thought have provided some analysis of the World Bank’s anti-
corruption strategy and the extent to which it represents tenets of the new development 
economics.  Meier summarizes the World Bank’s institution-building strategy as of 2001/2002 
as, “Complement what exists, innovate, connect, promote competition.”29  Such an assessment 
suggests that the World Bank is pursuing a range of policies, some of which, like “promote 
competition”, carry distinctly neoliberal ideas and others that are not obviously aligned with 
neoliberal objectives, such as “innovate” and “complement what exists.”  However, Rodrik 
disagrees, arguing, “there is little evidence that operational work at the Bank has internalized 
these lessons to any significant extent.”30  He cites continuing biases toward identifying 
governmental impediments to investment, such as legal restrictions, while ignoring potentially 
inhibiting effects of market factors as evidence.
31
  Furthermore, he argues that the World Bank’s 
reform strategy is still biased toward a best-practice model that “presumes it is possible to 
determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante.”32  For Rodrik, any 
attempt to generalize institutional reform efforts, which he sees as a continuing tendency in 
World Bank policies, is evidence that the Bank has so far failed to completely adopt the agenda 
of the new development economics.
33
  This critique aligns with discourse scholars in the first 
school of thought who see non-contextual approaches to corruption as a sign of continued 
adherence to the neoliberal agenda. 
 Despite the insights provided by scholars arguing for the evolutionary view of 
development economics and the World Bank, critical questions remain unanswered.  For one, 
                                                 
29
 Meier 141. 
30
 Rodrik and World Bank 977. 
31
 Dani Rodrik, “Second-Best Institutions,” The American Economic Review, 98, no. 2 (2008): 101-102. 
32
 Rodrik, “Second-Best Institutions,” 100. 
33
 Rodrik and World Bank 979-980. 
Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 18. 
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although Rodrik argues that the World Bank has so far failed to embrace the new development 
economics in full, he does not evaluate the extent to which the World Bank has moved away 
from the neoliberal agenda.  Furthermore, scholars writing on the evolution of development 
economics tend to focus broadly on institution-building.  While anti-corruption policies are 
certainly a component of institution-building, they have been under-examined as a specific 
manifestation of the new development economics. 
Little Change in the Post-Washington Consensus 
 Bayliss and Cramer summarize the arguments of scholars who question the real degree of 
change that occurred in the post-Washington Consensus, stating, “The post-Washington 
Consensus is really characterized by a broadening of policy tools around a slightly more relaxed 
version of basically the same core ideas contained in the Washington Consensus.”34  Van 
Waeyenberge makes a similar argument, pointing out that the post-Washington Consensus 
merely expandss the goals that market-based tools can be used to achieve, or, as Fine puts it, 
“extends the market-based approach from the market to the non-market arena (for the building of 
good governance, social capital and so on).”35  Rather than fundamentally changing the 
objectives of development, the World Bank is merely, “pegging ‘social concerns’ (expenditure 
reviews, social safety nets, compensatory programs) and ‘participatory measures’ 
(‘transparency’, ‘ownership’, role of ‘social partners’) onto the core policies of stabilization, 
                                                 
34
 Kate Bayliss and Christopher Cramer, “Privitisation and the post-Washington Consensus: Between the lab and the 
real world?” in Development Policy in the Twenty-first Century: Beyond the post-Washington Consensus, Ben Fine, 
Costas Lapavitsas, and Jonathan Pincus (eds.) (London: Routledge, 2001), 55. 
35
 Elisa Van Waeyenberge, “From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: Illusions of Development,” in The 
New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus. Jomo K.S. and Ben Fine (eds.) (Shahpur Jat: Tulika 
Books, 2006), 34. 
Ben Fine, “The New Development Economics,” in The New Development Economics: After the Washington 
Consensus. Jomo K.S. and Ben Fine (eds.) (Shahpur Jat: Tulika Books, 2006), 11. 
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liberalization and privatization.”36  Scholars adhering to such arguments acknowledge that the 
Bank has changed its agenda, but see the strategies it employs as fundamentally neoliberal. 
 Dasgupta offers an insightful analysis of the “new political economy” as the theoretical 
underpinning that has caused the Washington Consensus to persist into the post-Washington 
Consensus era.  The new political economy sees those in power as non-benevolent, self-
interested actors only concerned with maintaining their own power and becoming wealthy 
through rent-seeking.
37
  Since rent-seeking is, “associated with controls and other restrictive 
measures, doing away with all controls in a liberalization package is a major way of handling 
such behavior.”38  Such policies are nearly perfectly aligned with the Washington Consensus.39  
Thus, when corruption became a major issue on the development agenda, Dasgupta argues that 
the Washington Consensus already had a solution to the problem, one that did not change any of 
its other policies but merely extended their use to problems of governance.  Dasgupta’s argument 
is important for understanding the World Bank’s policies as well as the position of scholars who 
argue that the post-Washington Consensus differs little from the original Washington Consensus.  
However, it requires evidence to substantiate the claim that neoliberal policies were actually 
employed to combat corruption. 
 Scholars representing this school of thought typically invoke evidence from specific 
cases, providing evidence for their view in isolation but failing to assess whether such trends 
continue today or were merely symptoms of the transition from the Washington Consensus to a 
distinct post-Washington Consensus.  One popular case is the World Bank’s treatment of growth 
in East Asia, as it involved high levels of government intervention.  While acknowledging the 
                                                 
36
 Van Waeyendberge 30. 
37
 Biplab Dasgupta Structural Adjustment, Global Trade and the New Political Economy of Development (London: 
Zed Books, 1998), 31. 
38
 Dasgupta 38. 
39
 Ibid. 
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large role that government played, the World Bank highlighted three caveats: the growth was 
context-specific and the same strategies would not work elsewhere, all countries enjoying growth 
had gotten fundamentals like financial systems and macroeconomic stability right, and such 
growth required a high-quality, impartial, and non-corrupt civil service to work.
40
   
Such an analysis could provide evidence in support of scholars who see the discourse on 
corruption as a justification for continued adherence to the neoliberal agenda, as identifying 
corrupt civil servants as a limitation for growth renders Bank intervention necessary; however 
the analysis as a whole poses serious limitations.  While studying the World Bank’s response to 
the East Asian miracle is illuminating, it is a single case that cannot provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of the World Bank’s commitment to the neoliberal agenda over time.  Furthermore, it 
has now been a decade since Japan commissioned the Bank to report on growth in East Asia, so 
it is possible that Bank positions have evolved over time in the manner put forward by scholars 
who argue that the Bank moved from the Washington Consensus to the new development 
economics.  These scholars also share a deficiency with those arguing for the new development 
economics in their broad focus on institutions rather than a focus on corruption.  Therefore, my 
work will examine their arguments in the specific case of corruption. 
Conclusion 
 Views on the World Bank’s corruption discourse are diverse, but each group of scholarly 
arguments and approaches exhibits limitations and scholars espousing different perspectives 
rarely directly engage with one another.  Recognizing the full range of views will ground my 
analysis in a richer theoretical framework than any school of thought could provide alone, 
ensuring that my analysis accounts for trends of continuing or expanded neoliberalism as well as 
evidence of an evolution away from the Washington Consensus.  By updating some scholars’ 
                                                 
40
 Dasgupta 256, 301-302. 
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work and focusing specifically on corruption while expanding the theoretical underpinnings of 
the analysis, I can provide a rigorous evaluation of the extent to which the Bank’s discourse on 
corruption attempts to further the neoliberal agenda. 
Research Design 
 Case Selection 
 The World Bank represents a key case when examining the effect of the neoliberal 
discourse on anti-corruption policies.  It provides an influential case in the study of anti-
corruption measures because its early involvement in the field and the high priority it has placed 
on corruption over the last fifteen years have rendered it an international leader in approaches to 
anti-corruption.  Concurrently, the Bank has played a significant role in shaping the discourse on 
corruption through its anti-corruption strategies, speeches by Word Bank presidents that focus on 
corruption, and references to corruption in its annual World Development Reports.  Given that 
the IMF and the World Bank were largely responsible for promoting structural adjustment 
policies around the world, the Bank could feasibly be motivated to shape the discourse in such a 
way that alleviates responsibility for past failures while simultaneously providing an avenue to 
continue pursuing the neoliberal agenda underlying structural adjustment through anti-corruption 
measures.  Since the World Bank employs its own anti-corruption strategy while concurrently 
producing research on corruption, it possesses multiple avenues for influencing the discourse.  
This combination of policy and research enables it to pursue a neoliberal agenda on numerous 
fronts.  Therefore, it is an important case in examining the extent to which anti-corruption 
measures are being used to pursue the neoliberal agenda because it represents an organization 
with a history of adhering to a neoliberal agenda and a possible motive for continuing to do so. 
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Propositions 
The question under investigation is the degree to which World Bank publications 
addressing corruption reflect a focus on advancing the neoliberal agenda.  There are a number of 
critical propositions to consider when answering this question.  Most obvious are those stating 
that the policies outlined in the original Washington Consensus, specifically those addressing 
privatization, liberalization, and competition, indicate adherence to the neoliberal agenda.  
Others have been taken from the literature critiquing the neoliberal discourse on corruption as 
ways to identify neoliberal influence, as a discourse based on neoliberal theory has a number of 
symptoms identified by scholars.  These are useful because they augment the more obviously 
neoliberal propositions taken directly from the Washington Consensus to expand the basis of my 
analysis of World Bank anti-corruption documents, highlighting patterns to look for in the 
approach of the World Bank that could help discern the extent to which the Bank’s anti-
corruption policy is aligned with the neoliberal agenda.  These propositions are outlined below:  
Neoliberalism struggles to define corruption: Scholars including Brown and Cloke, 
Everett, et al, and Bedirhanoğlu argue that the neoliberal discourse exhibits a lack of clarity 
when addressing what acts constitute corruption.
41
  Such definitional confusion stems from the 
problem that, “too much is expected of corruption as a single term, it cannot encompass so many 
different types of behavior and motivations.”42  In their examination of the international anti-
corruption discourse, Everett, Neu, and Rahaman identify twelve different types of corruption 
ranging from “petty” and “grand” to “official” and “productive.”43  They further argue that acts 
                                                 
41
 Brown and Cloke 284. 
Everett, et al 3. 
Bedirhanoğlu 1245. 
42
 Brown and Cloke 284. 
43
 Everett et al 3. 
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included under corruption are so ill-defined that scholars authoring a 2001 study, “list no less 
than sixty acts one might qualify as corrupt.”44   
Such ambiguity in defining corruption is far from accidental in the minds of discourse 
scholars.  Polzer asserts that connecting corruption, a phenomenon associated with impeding 
economic growth and thus an economic issue within the mandate of the World Bank, with a wide 
range of issues and actions enables the international development community to become 
involved in a host of capacities as, “‘administrators’, ‘institutions’, and even ‘governments’ 
became non-political and open for intervention.”45  Thus, Bank documents allowing the 
definition of corruption to remain broad or advocating action in a multiplicity of capacities will 
demonstrate continued adherence to a neoliberal agenda, while specific, nuanced definitions will 
provide evidence against neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism constructs a public/private dichotomy: Attempting to draw definitive 
boundaries separating the public and private sphere is another symptom of the neoliberal 
discourse with a number of serious consequences for policy.
46
  The broadest of these is a focus 
on reducing the size and influence of the state.  Since corruption often involves a blurring of the 
public and private sphere when officials use government offices for personal gain and firms use 
money to buy political influence, the neoliberal solution is to impose complete separation.  
Szeftel argues that this often occurs by, “reducing the size and activities of a state that is ‘too 
big’ and fostering the growth of a ‘civil society’ of NGOs and associations which at present is 
‘too small’ and ‘too weak.’”47  However, Brown and Cloke highlight the issue with such a 
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policy—those agencies that are cut when government is being scaled down are often important 
for maintaining transparency and accountability.
48
  For instance, Szeftel points out that when 
states are required to reduce their size, agencies like audit structures tend be lacking, diminishing 
the strength of the state along with its size.
49
  This presents a complex issue in addressing the 
extent to which World Bank policies reflects the neoliberal agenda, as the past decade has seen 
an increasing focus on rebuilding state capacity reflecting the realization that, “a ‘strong’ state, 
not only a ‘minimal’ one, is needed.”50  Although some scholars argue that rebuilding state 
capacity where it had been previously diminished by structural adjustment is evidence of 
neoliberalism, I will consider any attempts to increase the power of the state or the size of the 
state as evidence of a shift away from neoliberalism.   
Another consequence related to the broader theme of the public/private dichotomy is that 
the role individuals play in giving and accepting bribes is often ignored.  Szeftel argues, 
“Seminars, handbooks and education are important and uplifting, and economic sanctions 
worrying for governments, but they are unlikely to influence individuals being offered thousands 
of dollars by multinationals or by drug dealers.”51  A related consequence is a heavy emphasis on 
government officials who are taking bribes while those offering bribes go unaddressed, which 
Bukovansky attributes to the neoliberal consensus that foreign investment generates economic 
growth.  Having identified multinationals as an important source of capital, neoliberals divert 
attention away from those paying bribes to those who receive them, thereby ignoring the demand 
for bribery and focusing exclusively on the supply.
52
 The neoliberal agenda goes further than just 
protecting corruption in the private sector in the name of economic growth.  As Polzer puts it, 
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“While in the private sector, firms and individuals are expected to seek personal profit and 
enrichment, organizations and individuals in the public sector are expected selflessly to fulfill a 
duty to a greater public good,” adding an ideological impetus to ignore private acts of corruption 
and to focus on the role of public officials.
53
 Therefore, evidence that the World Bank’s updated 
strategy includes provisions to address the demand for corruption alongside its supply will 
suggest an evolution of the World Bank’s strategy away from neoliberal aims. 
Neoliberalism unifies the neoliberal discourse with the democratization discourse: 
Harrison states, “anti-corruption is closely associated with the governance agenda in 
development, itself a manifestation of greater intrusion of neo-liberalism in the architecture of 
aid.”54  Using this perspective, democratization efforts that comprise parts of the World Bank’s 
anti-corruption discourse must be considered evidence of a neoliberal bias.  Szeftel explains the 
logic behind such strategies, stating: 
“The proposition that democracy can limit the worst excesses of corruption by making it easier to 
scrutinize and regulate the operation of the state—because public institutions are more responsible, 
transparent and accountable and because political and legal costs are more easily imposed on corrupt 
officials—is the core language of conditionality, liberalization, good governance and democratization, of 
donor and local democrat alike.”55 
It follows logically that the critical components of the solutions associated with democratization 
involve more political competition.
56
  Therefore, an emphasis on democratization will signal 
neoliberalism if it is being used in an effort to increase political competition and efficiency rather than 
constituting its own end as an objective of good governance. 
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  Neoliberal solutions to corruption are technical in nature: Polzer explains the 
increasing tendency toward technical solutions as following, “from the idea…that the main 
issues of political contestation have been solved—through liberal economic management and 
democracy—and that the only remaining task is to manage the most efficient achievement of 
these goals [democracy and free market capitalism] around the world.”57  Brown and Cloke as 
well as Harrison support Polzer’s analysis, arguing that neoliberalism is inhibited by its techno-
centric solutions to corruption and that it has hindered the development of non-technical 
solutions by directing the most funding toward models and formulas.
58
  Therefore technical 
assistance, particularly in the absence of other anti-corruption efforts, represents a sign of 
neoliberalism. 
One related consequence of technocratic solutions to corruption is that, “data is not only 
intended to inform or challenge political judgment; it is constructed so as to replace the need for 
political judgment.”59  While the use of data to obviate the need for discretion will be difficult to 
identify within World Bank documents, it is important to bear in mind when evaluating anti-
corruption solutions. 
Neoliberalism takes an ahistorical, non-contextual approach to corruption: Szeftel, 
Bedirhanoğlu, and Brown and Cloke all argue that the neoliberal discourse treats corruption as 
entirely endogenous to a state, ignoring historic factors as well as market factors that increase 
opportunities for rent-seeking.
60
  This proposition provides a strong indicator for non-neoliberal 
objectives, as any mention of market or historical factors contributing to corruption will 
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constitute evidence of a shift away from the neoliberal agenda.  Conversely, its absence will 
speak to a continuing ahistorical view of corruption that fails to criticize the role of markets in 
providing opportunities for rent-seeking.  This is also manifested in policies that are generalized 
across countries, as one-size-fits-all solutions to corruption fail to acknowledge specific 
historical and contextual variables that could seriously affect the success of such policies. 
Comparative propositions: The study will primarily focus on how closely the World 
Bank’s anti-corruption strategies are aligned with neoliberal objectives.  However, in assessing 
the degree to which the Bank’s programs reflect the neoliberal agenda, it is necessary to examine 
alternative solutions to corruption as well.  Scholars, states, and other international organizations 
have contributed to the neoliberal discourse on corruption and multiple solutions have been 
identified that are not employed by the World Bank but which reflect neoliberal interests, while 
other solutions attempt to move away from neoliberalism.  To fully understand the degree to 
which the Bank’s policies align with neoliberal objectives, the degree to which alternative 
solutions align with those goals is a key proposition.  For almost every solution proposed, it is 
critical to note that some scholars have argued for it and some against, demonstrating the lack of 
consensus around most anti-corruption measures.   
 Among the most obviously neoliberal solutions are recommendations to increase 
competition and reduce the size of the state, typically using privatization, openness to trade and 
reductions in the discretionary power of the state.  Ades and Di Tella recommend openness to 
trade along with anti-trust laws and other measures to decrease the presence of rents and 
Treisman concurs, noting that while the effect of open markets on corruption is small, "A sober 
evaluation of the limits of liberalization policy should not, of course, obscure the fact that it is 
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one of the few possible effective levers that central reformers have."
61
  However, Serra finds no 
robust tie between openness and corruption and Rodrik argues that openness is not a solution to 
corruption because strong institutions are required to actually benefit from free trade.
62
  
Similarly, Tanzi and La Porta, et al, argue for decreased state power to reduce opportunities for 
corruption, but Serra and Khan both argue that there is little evidence that decreasing regulation 
will reduce corruption.
63
  In a similar vein, Tanzi argues for increasing the wages of public 
officials to increase the opportunity cost of corruption and to make the civil service more 
competitive, but La Porta, et al, Treisman, and Khan disagree, arguing that wage increases 
represent a superficial solution at best.
64
 
 Another range of solutions that are commonly characterized as neoliberal, although they 
are less obviously so than open and competitive markets, are those relying on democracy and 
civic participation.  Serra argues that democracy is strongly, inversely related to corruption while 
Treisman finds that states must enjoy over forty years of continuous democracy for it to have a 
significant, negative effect on corruption.
65
  On the other side of the debate are Tanzi, who sees 
numerous opportunities for corruption in democratic societies, and Khan, who argues, “the 
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relevant political reforms cannot be generalized and certainly have little to do with the promotion 
of democracy or of civil society, or other such bland objectives.”66  Some of these debates arise 
from the difference between democracy in strong democratic governments, which typically 
exhibit low levels of corruption, and processes of democratization, which provide numerous 
opportunities for corruption.  Nevertheless, scholars have failed to reach a consensus on the role 
of democracy in anti-corruption efforts.  Similarly, Serra and Rodrik insist that civic 
participation is critical to reducing corruption, as transparency will only be effective if civil 
society has a strong voice, but Ades and Di Tella and Treisman fail to find evidence that political 
rights decrease corruption.
67
  Related to such measures are attempts to strengthen the judicial 
system and increase the penalties associated with corruption to alter the calculations of civil 
servants contemplating corrupt behavior, which Damania, et al, support as the most important 
anti-corruption measure but which Tanzi views as infeasible given significant opportunities for 
corruption within the judiciary.
68
 
 Among all of the solutions to corruption that I encountered, there are only two without 
arguments against them.  The first is to increase transparency.
69
  Although some scholars add the 
caveat that it must be coupled with a democratic political system to ensure electoral 
consequences for corrupt behavior, making information about government operations more 
freely available seems to be one solution enjoying a consensus.  The other solution centers on 
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norm-shifting.
70
  Sandholtz and Gray find that membership in international organizations 
represents a successful method for changing and diffusing anti-corruption norms, while 
Bukovansky insists that anti-corruption measures will be futile without concurrent shifts in the 
norms of a society.
71
 
 Although this represents at best a broad overview of current thinking on anti-corruption 
strategies, the range of solutions and the debates over many solutions illustrates the wide array of 
policies the World Bank can choose to endorse.  Understanding the controversies surrounding 
various measures as well as the extent to which each aligns with neoliberal objectives should 
illuminate the World Bank’s discourse on corruption. 
 Table 1 summarizes the range of propositions being used to determine to what extent the 
World Bank’s anti-corruption discourse reflects neoliberal values and an attempt to further the 
neoliberal agenda. 
Table 1: Propositions 
Proposition Evidence for proposition Evidence against proposition 
The policies outlined in the 
original Washington 
Consensus, specifically those 
addressing privatization, 
liberalization, and 
competition indicate 
adherence to the neoliberal 
agenda. 
 Solutions that prioritize 
Washington Consensus 
policies over other 
alternatives 
 Failure to consider 
alternative solutions to 
corruption 
 Identifying corruption as 
the reason for the failure 
of structural adjustment 
 Solutions including and 
prioritizing policies not 
enumerated in the 
Washington Consensus 
 Acknowledgement of the 
limitations inherent in 
market-based solutions 
to corruption 
Neoliberalism struggles to 
define corruption. 
 Multiple definitions of 
corruption within a 
single document 
 Vague definitions of 
 Clear definitions of 
corruption 
 Acknowledgement of 
varied and multiple 
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corruption 
 Failure to define 
corruption 
 Solutions requiring Bank 
intervention in a 
multiplicity of capacities 
manifestations of 
corruption 
 Clear limits to the areas 
in which the Bank will 
intervene 
Neoliberalism constructs a 
public/private dichotomy 
 Focus on the state as the 
primary perpetrator of 
corruption 
 Failure to acknowledge 
the role of private 
companies in 
contributing to 
corruption 
 Solutions pertaining only 
to the state 
 Acknowledgement of the 
role private firms play in 
corrupt transactions, 
particularly large 
multinational 
corporations 
 Acknowledgement of 
state limitations in 
dealing with corruption 
Neoliberalism unifies the 
neoliberal discourse with the 
democratization discourse 
 Transparency and 
political/electoral 
competition solely for the 
purpose of punishing 
corrupt officials and 
increasing accountability 
 Democracy solely as a 
means to increase 
competition 
 Transparency and 
political/electoral 
competition as 
components of good 
governance to be 
pursued for their own 
sake 
 Democracy as a goal 
rather than a tool of 
development 
Neoliberal solutions to 
corruption are technical in 
nature 
 Technical solutions to 
corruption coupled with 
a lack of non-technical 
solutions 
 Solutions including 
significant non-technical 
components 
Neoliberalism takes an 
ahistorical, non-contextual 
approach to corruption 
 One-size-fits-all solutions 
to corruption 
 Focus on “best practices” 
in eliminating corruption 
 Attempts to encourage 
country-driven solutions. 
 Moves away from 
generalized “best 
practices” for reducing 
corruption 
Comparative propositions  World Bank solutions 
that match those 
identified as neoliberal 
by scholars 
 World Bank solutions 
that match those 
identified as non-
neoliberal by scholars 
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Methodology  
To evaluate to what extent the World Bank’s anti-corruption policy is designed to allow it 
to pursue neoliberal objectives, I perform a discourse analysis on the World Bank’s anti-
corruption strategies from 1997 and 2012, World Development Reports since 1995, and speeches 
by World Bank Presidents that deal with corruption.  Table 2 identifies all of the speeches used 
for the analysis, which were chosen from all of the presidential addresses housed on the World 
Bank’s website because they address corruption in significant depth.  When performing the 
analysis, I specifically focus on the propositions described above to identify words, phrases, and 
concepts that reflect neoliberalism such as competition, reduced government intervention, and 
privatization as well as those that counter neoliberal principals such as expanding government 
powers, protecting individuals or firms from competition, and punishing bribers.  Evaluating the 
basic frequency of each provides a general sense of the extent to which the World Bank’s 
strategy is or is not aligned with neoliberal goals, but I also assess each overall document to 
ascertain the relative importance of neoliberal versus anti-neoliberal ideas within it.  By 
conducting a discourse analysis, I will be able to assess the degree to which the Bank is pursuing 
a neoliberal agenda through its current anti-corruption program as well as the evolution of its 
anti-corruption stance over time to determine if its policies have become more or less aligned 
with neoliberal objectives in the past fifteen years. 
Table 2: Presidential Speeches Addressing Corruption 
Speaker Speech Date 
James Wolfensohn “People and Development.” Oct. 1, 1996 
James Wolfensohn “The Other Crisis: 1998 Annual Meetings Address.” Oct. 6, 1998 
James Wolfensohn “Remarks at the International Conference on 
Democracy, Market Economy and Development.” 
Feb. 26, 1999 
James Wolfensohn “Remarks at the 9th International Anti-Corruption 
Conference.” 
Oct. 11, 1999 
James Wolfensohn “Development Choices in a Changing World.” Nov. 11, 1999 
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James Wolfensohn “Speech at the Multi-Sectoral Conference on 
Partnerships for Governance and Development.” 
Feb. 26, 2000 
James Wolfensohn “Remarks at the 2nd Global Forum: A Democratic 
State and Governance in the 21
st
 Century.” 
May 30, 2000 
James Wolfensohn “Empowerment, Security and Opportunity Through 
Law and Justice.” 
July 9, 2001 
James Wolfensohn “Opening Address to the Third Conference of 
International Investigators of United Organizations 
and Multilateral Financial Institutions.” 
Mar. 7, 2002 
James Wolfensohn “A Moment for Kenyans to Act.” July 23, 2003 
Paul Wolfowitz “Parliaments Valuable to Fight Corruption, the 
Parliamentary Network at the World Bank, 
Helsinki.” 
Oct. 22, 2005 
Paul Wolfowitz “Good Governance and Development—A Time for 
Actions, Jakarta.” 
Apr. 11, 2006 
Paul Wolfowitz “Investing in Sustainable Development: The Value 
Question, International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN) Conference, Washington, D.C.” 
July 6, 2006 
Paul Wolfowitz “Coordinating for Good Governance, Development 
Committee, Annual Meetings, Singapore.” 
Sep. 18, 2006 
Paul Wolfowitz “Path to Prosperity, Annual Meetings, Singapore.” Sep. 19, 2006 
Paul Wolfowitz “Transparency in Extractive Industries, EITI 
Conference, Oslo.” 
Oct. 16, 2006 
Paul Wolfowitz “International Conference on Improving Governance 
and Fighting Corruption, Brussels.” 
Mar. 14, 2007 
Robert B. Zoellick “Launch of Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.” Sep. 17, 2007 
Robert B. Zoellick “Modernizing Multilateralism: Learning from 
Military History.” 
Oct. 6, 2008 
Robert B. Zoellick “The Middle East and North Africa: A New Social 
Contract for Development.” 
Apr. 6, 2011 
Robert B. Zoellick “Conrad H. Hilton Humanitarian Award.” Apr. 16, 2012 
Jim Yong Kim “World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim Speech 
on Anti-Corruption at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.” 
Jan. 30, 2013 
 
Results 
Patterns Emerging Over Time 
 There are clear patterns that emerge over time in the World Bank discourse, creating a 
general trend from a strictly neoliberal discourse in the early years that the Bank began 
addressing corruption to an increasingly nuanced discussion of the issue in the most recent 
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speeches of Bank Presidents, World Development Reports (WDRs), and its 2012 updated anti-
corruption strategy.  I present them loosely in blocks of years, but it is worth noting that the 
change is gradual and there are rarely definitive shifts from one year to another.   
 In the first three years that corruption became a major item on the Bank’s agenda (1995-
1997), the discourse on corruption is virtually identical to the neoliberal discourse as a whole.  
The Bank maintains the stance that the policies outlined in the Washington Consensus will 
address corruption and argues that privatization and liberalization are baseline conditions that 
must be met for the eradication of corruption to be possible.  Take for instance this passage from 
the 1997 World Development Report: 
“In general, any reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy will reduce incentives 
for corrupt behavior.  Thus policies that lower controls on foreign trade, remove entry barriers 
to private industry, and privatize state firms in a way that ensures competition will all support 
the fight.  If the state has no authority to restrict exports or to license businesses, there will be no 
opportunities to pay bribes in those areas.”72 
Similar arguments are prevalent throughout the Bank’s 1997 anti-corruption strategy, “Helping 
Countries Combat Corruption.”  In fact, the list of “Macroeconomic policy and sector policy 
reforms that contribute to the expansion of markets and the reduction of rents,” is in many ways 
identical to the Washington Consensus, as it includes,  
“Lowering tariffs and other barriers to international trade. Moving from dual to single exchange 
rates, with market-determined rates. Introducing competitive credit markets. Eliminating price 
controls. Cutting subsidies to enterprises. Reducing regulations, licensing requirements, and 
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other barriers to entry for new firms, both domestic and foreign. Privatizing government assets 
in clearly competitive markets. Abolishing monopoly export marketing boards.
73” 
 Such results strongly align with discourse scholars critiquing the World Bank’s anti-
corruption policies as a means to further the neoliberal agenda.  In addition to statements that 
explicitly advocate for measures to increase competition and decrease government power, there 
is a strong public/private dichotomy throughout the documents in the early years.  The Bank 
focuses exclusively on reducing state intervention to reduce opportunities for corruption while 
failing to acknowledge the role of private firms in corrupt transactions.  The only nuance comes 
with small caveats regarding the manner in which privatization is conducted, for instance, 
“Liberalization, demonopolization, and—if transparent—rapid privatization are key steps to 
reducing these two sources of huge economic rents.”74  Thus, it is fair to say that the Bank 
maintained a strong neoliberal stance in these early years, supporting the argument of scholars 
who say that the anti-corruption agenda is merely another way for the World Bank to advance 
the neoliberal agenda. 
 The last years of the twentieth century see an increasing acknowledgement of the 
importance of the state, although competition and free markets continue to be preferred 
solutions.  Within the WDRs, this period exhibits the same strong public/private dichotomy as 
the early period, but speeches by President James Wolfensohn begin to highlight roles that the 
state must take on along with responsibilities shared by private actors.  He increasingly speaks of 
a financial system that, “monitors and supervises banks and the private sector,” and also 
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discusses the critical regulatory capacity of states.
75
  The difference between the discourse in 
President Wolfensohn’s speeches and the WDRs of this period illustrates a consistent trend—that 
presidential speeches tend to lead the discourse, exhibiting shifts one to two years before the 
shifts are mirrored in the WDRs.  Even with these early shifts in thinking, this period continues 
to largely support the argument that the anti-corruption policies coming out of the World Bank 
were heavily informed by neoliberalism. 
 In the early twenty-first century (2000-2005), the public/private dichotomy begins to 
slowly erode from the discourse on corruption.  There remains a significant discussion of the role 
of the state as a creator of opportunities for corruption, but it is increasingly coupled with an 
acknowledgement of the need to regulate the private sector and hold firms, particularly those 
from developed countries, accountable for corruption.  Again, this shift is undertaken first by 
presidents, as when President Wolfowitz said, “Every corrupt transaction, when you think about 
it, has to have at least two parties—sometimes, it’s a whole conspiracy—and often, the bribe-
giver in a developing country comes from a developed country.”76  While the public/private 
dichotomy diminishes in the international sphere during this time period, domestic firms are 
often still constructed as victims of corruption.  For instance, the 2003 WDR states, “Corruption 
is a major risk entrepreneurs face, because government officials seeking bribes can undermine 
the viability of an entire investment.  Paying bribes to continue business operations also lowers 
returns, reducing the incentive to invest.”77  Thus, although the public/private dichotomy is 
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significantly reduced in highlighting the role of multinational firms, at a domestic level it 
remains in place, blaming governments and portraying firms as victims rather than participants in 
corruption.   
 Concurrently, the discourse on corruption starts to be unified with the democratization 
discourse in this era as the role of civic participation and transparency move to the forefront of 
the solutions being proposed.  As early as 2002, the WDR states, “Political institutions such as 
constitutional rules, the division of power among levels of government, independent agencies’ 
mechanisms for citizens to monitor public behavior, and rules that inhibit corruption all succeed 
in restraining public officials of the state from arbitrary action, and good governance will likely 
take root.”78  From this time onward, the prevalence of the market-based solutions of the early 
years in the Bank’s anti-corruption efforts is replaced with an emphasis on transparency, 
democracy, and civic participation.  At this point, the arguments of scholars who see the anti-
corruption discourse as a manifestation of the Bank’s neoliberal agenda begin to break down as 
the Bank expands its areas of engagement and moves away from market-based solutions. 
 These trends are intensified and heightened from 2006 to the present.  The public/private 
dichotomy diminishes even further as Presidents Wolfowitz and Zoellick repeatedly condemn 
the involvement of firms from developed countries in corrupt transactions while WDRs 
increasingly focus on how to build state capacity rather than criticizing state involvement in the 
market.  Simultaneously, there is a shift away from generalized, universal solutions to an 
appreciation for country-specific factors and contexts.  WDRs from 2006 forward feature 
numerous text boxes highlighting successful policy innovations from different countries that 
address the problem of corruption in diverse but effective ways, and presidential speeches 
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increasingly focus on local ownership of anti-corruption strategies.  In a 2006 speech, President 
Wolfowitz declared, “We cannot ignore problems or challenges, instead we must find solutions 
which are innovative and flexible and which respect the unique constituents and conditions in 
each country.”79  This change signals a move toward acknowledging historical factors, 
highlighting the non-contextual nature of the earlier discourse.  President Kim continues the 
trend away from generalized solutions, explicitly saying, “We need to be focused more upon 
solving real-world problems than the traditional “best practice” model of institutional 
development.”80  This appears to be a shift toward the new development economics, suggesting 
that a more evolutionary view of the Bank might be more appropriate than arguments that paint 
the Bank as a static institution driven by the tenets of neoliberalism. 
 Since 2006, civic participation and transparency have become dominant in the corruption 
discourse.  The updated anti-corruption strategy released in 2012 centers on transparency and 
civic participation almost to the exclusion of all other methods to combat corruption.  This 
includes methods for gathering and disseminating information as well as efforts to increase civic 
participation and to build institutions in which citizens can be meaningfully involved.  Such a 
finding contradicts the argument of Everett, et al, that the Bank favors strategies designed to 
promote competition over those focusing on civic participation and voice.
81
  Policies explicitly 
focusing on market competition are no longer present in the World Bank discourse on 
corruption, so the question becomes to what extent transparency and civic participation are 
indicative of continued adherence to the neoliberal agenda.  If they are in fact moves away from 
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neoliberalism, they will comprise significant evidence for the evolutionary view of development 
economics at the World Bank.   
Figure 1 summarizes the progression of the Bank’s discourse on corruption over time. 
Figure 1: The World Bank’s discourse on corruption over time
 
 
1995---------------------------------------------------------------------2013 
The World Bank Discourse in the Context of the Larger Discourse on Corruption 
 The World Bank discourse moves along the spectrum of neoliberal to non-neoliberal over 
time.  After the late 1990s, trade liberalization and privatization diminish in their significance 
and are less frequently cited as primary solutions to corruption.  In many instances, the World 
Bank explicitly highlights the large opportunities for corruption inherent in privatization 
processes that are not transparent, moving the discourse away from competitive solutions and 
toward democratic solutions.  Concurrently, the focus on the real wages of civil servants declines 
as the emphasis shifts from making the civil service competitive with a high opportunity cost for 
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job loss to building a stronger, more capable civil service held in check through electoral 
accountability.   
 The dominance of transparency coupled with civic participation is unsurprising in that 
transparency is one solution enjoying a consensus in the broader discourse on corruption; 
however, civic participation is not an uncontroversial measure in the literature.  As discussed 
previously, multiple authors have failed to find that civic participation and democracy have a 
significant effect on corruption, while others have found both to be important.  The Bank’s 
silence on such debates may provide evidence for the claim that the democratization discourse is 
merely another way for the Bank to impose conditionality and to exercise power over less 
developed countries, but it is also possible that the Bank does not discuss it because transparency 
is less powerful in the absence of civic participation and democratic processes.  I will explore the 
extent to which transparency and civic participation represent neoliberal interests shortly. 
 Perhaps the least neoliberal measure in the literature on corruption is norm-shifting.  
While norm-shifting is not a measure that the World Bank can explicitly address in WDRs, there 
are multiple instances of Bank presidents highlighting the role the Bank has played in bringing 
corruption to the forefront of development.  President Zoellick argued in 2008, “the Bank needs 
to do more than just investigate, prosecute, and penalize fraud and theft. We need to set 
standards, live them, and promote their broader adoption.”82  Even as early as 1999, President 
Wolfensohn demonstrated his awareness of the norm-diffusing role of the Bank, saying, 
“Everybody talks about corruption…we put it at the center of the Finance Ministry’s agenda.  
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That was an enormous step forward.”83  Such statements show that the Bank is aware of the 
power it exercises over the discourse on corruption and that it has endeavored to exercise that 
power to mainstream corruption as a critical issue in development. 
Key Propositions 
 As the preceding results demonstrate, there are four broadly represented propositions that 
inform the extent to which the World Bank’s discourse surrounding corruption furthers the 
neoliberal agenda.  While each proposition is critical in itself, the most informative aspect of 
each derives from the way in which it changes over time. 
 Explicit components of the Washington Consensus: Between 1995 and 2005 there has 
been a clear, rapid decline in the frequency that policies associated with the Washington 
Consensus such as privatization and liberalization are touted as solutions to corruption.  Such a 
definitive decline suggests that the Bank began moving away from obvious and explicit 
neoliberalism in the twenty-first century.   
Public/private dichotomy: Tracing the shift from an exclusive focus on states as the 
causes and perpetrators of corruption to increasingly balanced views that acknowledge the role 
of private firms and individuals in corrupt transactions is strong evidence that the Bank began to 
move away from its strong neoliberal focus in the late 1990s.  While firms, particularly small 
enterprises, are often still portrayed as victims of corruption, the Bank has recognized the 
pressures governments face from large multinational corporations.  Without absolving 
governments of responsibility, the Bank has opened a nuanced discussion of the roles played by 
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public and private actors, eroding the public/private dichotomy and moving away from the 
neoliberal agenda. 
 Unification with the democratization discourse: As the results demonstrate, the 
language of civic participation has become dominant in the past eight to ten years.  This 
constitutes evidence of continued adherence to neoliberalism, as scholars critiquing the discourse 
on corruption see the democratization discourse as equivalent to the broader neoliberal discourse.  
Thus, although there has been a decreased prevalence of the public/private dichotomy, it has 
arguably been offset by the reliance on the democratization discourse and the dominance of civic 
participation. 
 Ahistorical and non-contextual approaches to corruption: Along with the declining 
reliance on the policies of the original Washington Consensus and the public/private dichotomy 
has been an increasing appreciation for historical and market factors that shape corruption.  This 
is evidenced most clearly by the growing number of country case studies included in WDRs over 
the past decade that identify contextual factors shaping country strategies as well as presidential 
speeches advocating for a move away from generalized best-practices.  As this is the type of 
approach touted by Rodrik, a proponent of the new development economics, it suggests that the 
Bank may truly be abandoning neoliberalism and undergoing a comprehensive shift to the new 
development economics in its discourse and policies.   
 Other propositions: Although some of the other propositions identified as indicators of 
neoliberalism did surface occasionally in my analysis, they did not provide definitive evidence of 
the Bank’s agenda.  The Bank addresses confusion defining corruption in its 2012 updated anti-
corruption strategy, acknowledging that the definition has been broad and vague, but in general 
WDRs and other documents deal very little with defining corruption.  This could itself be 
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considered evidence of neoliberalism, as the Bank fails to consider the wide net it is casting with 
broad discussions of corruption; however, the documents examined do not necessarily 
demonstrate that the Bank has used its vague definitions to intervene in a multiplicity of areas.  
Thus, while confusion defining corruption may be present in the Bank’s discourse, the principle 
concerns associated with such ambiguity seem to be unfounded since the Bank has narrowly 
focused its anti-corruption efforts on transparency and civic participation.  Somewhat similarly, 
technical solutions were interspersed throughout the documents covered, but since all of the 
sources were broad, overarching documents meant to address global issues in general terms it 
was difficult to assess the preference for technical solutions. 
 Overall, the evidence is contradictory.  Certain neoliberal elements have declined 
significantly over time, such as the reliance on Washington Consensus policies to address 
corruption, the public/private dichotomy, and non-contextual approaches, but there has been a 
strong, persistent increase in the unification with the democratization discourse.  According to 
discourse scholars critiquing the Bank’s anti-corruption strategy, intertwining the anti-corruptio 
discourse with the democratization discourse demonstrates continued adherence to the neoliberal 
agenda.  Therefore, the extent to which the World Bank is acting to advance neoliberal interests 
reduces to the question of the extent to which democracy, civic participation, and transparency 
are methods for furthering the neoliberal agenda.  If the Bank is not using transparency and civic 
participation solely to increase political competition, it will be significant evidence that the Bank 
is evolving toward the new development economics rather than maintaining or expanding its 
neoliberal tendencies. 
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Discussion: “How neoliberal” are transparency and civic participation? 
   An important question to address before evaluating the degree to which a focus on 
transparency and civic participation embodies neoliberalism is whether it matters for evaluating 
the legitimacy of the World Bank.  That the World Bank’s discourse on corruption has evolved 
over time from an obviously neoliberal agenda to a focus on institutions, transparency, and civic 
participation demonstrates that the Bank is not simply pursuing a neoliberal agenda without 
regard to which strategies are the most effective.  However, the problem arises that the increased 
focus on transparency and civic participation could merely be indicative of the expanded post-
Washington Consensus that continues to adhere to the principles of the original Washington 
Consensus and merely increases the range of issues it is designed to address to cover 
traditionally non-economic realms such as politics and governance.   
 The simple answer is to argue that if neoliberalism is strictly limited to the ten policies 
enumerated in the Washington Consensus, then transparency, democracy, and civic participation 
are not neoliberal and therefore the Bank is not acting to advance the neoliberal agenda.  
However, discourse scholars identify unification of the corruption discourse with the 
democratization discourse as a symptom of the neoliberal agenda.  Therefore, answering the 
fundamental question about the relationship between transparency, civic participation, and 
neoliberalism requires a re-examination of the justification for identifying unification with the 
democratization discourse as evidence of neoliberalism.  Szeftel argues that making states easier 
to scrutinize and hold accountable is, “the core language of conditionality, liberalization, good 
governance, and democratization.”84  His argument suggests that democratization is associated 
with neoliberalism to the extent that it is a means to the end of creating a more competitive 
environment for governments by opening them to scrutiny and electoral consequences rather 
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than being pursued as its own end of good governance.  The critical question now becomes 
whether transparency, democracy, and civic participation are being used merely as ways to 
increase competition within the government or are viewed as goals in themselves that will 
promote good governance. 
 Returning to the documents provides an answer.  From 1995 to 2004, virtually any quote 
regarding transparency, civic participation, or democracy explicitly states that the purpose of 
such reforms is to increase efficiency and competition.  For instance, the 2000-2001 WDR states, 
“Another important measure is disseminating information to allow people to monitor public 
service.  Using newspapers and other popular information sources to disseminate information in 
budget allocations and spending enables people to hold civil servants accountable, reducing 
inefficiency and corruption.”85  In this passage, making information available is not an end, but a 
means of “holding civil servants accountable, reducing inefficiency and corruption,” making the 
goal monitoring the government rather than building a stronger government.  Similarly, the 2003 
WDR says, “Civil society and the media also play an important monitoring role—for example, 
improving accountability and reducing incentives for corruption in government.  The commercial 
exploitation of natural resources is particularly susceptible to corruption…An active civil society 
makes it easier for environmental officials and others to publicize mismanagement.”86  Again, 
the Bank promotes an active civil society because it has powers to curb corruption in natural 
resource rents, not because it constitutes an important component of good governance.  At this 
point, the argument becomes slightly problematic since presumably reducing inefficiency by 
monitoring government officials also contributes to goals of good governance, but as the 
passages demonstrate, it is possible to distinguish between using transparency and civic 
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participation as a tool to create more competitive forces for government officials and pursuing 
them as necessary elements of good governance. 
 To further illustrate that such a distinction can be drawn, consider this passage from the 
2011 WDR, “Conflict, Security, and Development”: “Institutional legitimacy is the key to 
stability.  When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or 
provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities 
have lost social cohesion—the likelihood of violent conflict increases.”87  Here, democratic 
rights like access to justice, security, and an absence of corruption are not touted as means to the 
end of increasing government efficiency and accountability, but as critical components of a well-
governed, peaceful state.  Although the 2012 updated anti-corruption strategy as well as recent 
WDRs continue to highlight the role of transparency and civic participation in heightening the 
efficacy and effectiveness of the state at times, since 2005 the discourse has begun to move away 
from an exclusive focus on transparency and civic participation as tools rather than ends.  Thus, 
the evidence moves away from supporting scholars arguing that transparency and civic 
participation are manifestations of neoliberalism to supporting proponents of the new 
development economics.  Coupled with the increasing appreciation for historical and other 
contextual factors shaping institutions and governance, the shift manifests itself as a conversation 
between the Bank and developing country citizens.  The Bank describes its “updated approach to 
institutional reform” in the following manner: 
“Focusing on ‘binding constraints’ in designing programs of support, rather than on a 
presumed solution based on institutional and organizational forms elsewhere; ensuring the Bank 
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identifies the same problem as the client; engaging flexibly and systematically with stakeholders 
over an extended period of time to identify both the problem and the likely solution.”88  
The move away from best practices and predetermined, non-contextual solutions creates space 
and demand for greater participation from in-country stakeholders in institution building, 
rendering transparency and civic participation critical components of good governance that must 
be in place for such participatory strategies to be effective. Although the shift away from 
transparency and civic participation as tools is far from complete, the direction of change is 
clear. 
Conclusion 
 Scholars critiquing the World Bank’s discourse on corruption as a manifestation of 
continued adherence to the neoliberal agenda were justified in the early years of the Bank’s 
involvement when the policies outlined in the Washington Consensus were taken as those that 
would be most effective in reducing corruption.  Since then, the Bank has gradually moved away 
from neoliberalism toward the new development economics as it has reduced its reliance on 
competition, diminished the public/private dichotomy, and fostered a greater appreciation for 
individual country contexts.  However, the anti-corruption discourse has become increasingly 
unified with the democratization discourse, suggesting that the Bank may still be pursuing a 
neoliberal agenda through the creation of political competition under an augmented Washington 
Consensus that uses economic tools in non-economic spheres.  Closer examination of the 
discourse specifically surrounding transparency and civic participation reveals that while the 
Bank did initially view transparency and civic participation solely as tools to achieve greater 
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government efficiency and to reduce corruption, in recent years they have come to be recognized 
as critical components of good governance, or as end goals in and of themselves. 
 Such results serve to clarify scholarly discourses surrounding the World Bank while 
deepening our understanding of the institution.  By bringing together a diverse range of scholarly 
views, I was able to search for numerous manifestations of neoliberalism from the obvious 
policies enumerated in the Washington Consensus to more subtle signals such as non-contextual 
approaches and the public/private dichotomy.  Concurrently, understanding the arguments of 
scholars like Meier and Rodrik ensured that notions of what constitutes neoliberalism remained 
limited and functional, ultimately enabling me to distinguish between the unification of the 
democratization discourse with the corruption discourse and a genuine shift toward incorporating 
transparency and civic participation into anti-corruption programs as pillars of good governance.  
My analysis provides strong support for the evolutionary view of the World Bank espoused by 
Rodrik and Meier while recognizing the legitimacy of arguments accusing the Bank of following 
a neoliberal agenda in the first years it dealt with anti-corruption.  The fact that the Bank has 
moved away from relying on neoliberal strategies to reduce corruption and has begun to push for 
governance reforms for their own sake suggests that the Bank is attempting to move toward the 
new development economics. Even if the Bank still exhibits symptoms of neoliberalism, the shift 
in its discourse demonstrates that it is capable of changing over time in response to the policies it 
has found effective and ineffective, which lends the Bank legitimacy as an international 
development institution. 
 There are a number of limitations of the study.  For one, the analysis is limited to the 
World Bank’s discourse on corruption as it is manifested in global documents such as anti-
corruption strategies and WDRs.  The discourse may be different in the strategies for individual 
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countries.  Similarly, the discourse I studied may not reflect the actual policies being 
implemented at the country or community level.  Even if the Bank as a whole is attempting to 
move away from generalized solutions and best practices, individual country offices may not be 
following suit and specific Bank policies could contradict the global discourse.  In fact, changing 
the discourse in highly public documents like the WDRs would be a relatively easy way for the 
Bank to address criticisms of its neoliberal tendencies without making substantive changes to its 
operational policies. 
 Given the limitations of this study, future research should extend the analysis to specific 
cases and include interviews with World Bank personnel.  Examining the discourse of country-
specific strategies and comparing it to the Bank’s global discourse will shed light on the extent to 
which the global discourse is being operationalized.  Undertaking analyses of anti-corruption 
budgets for specific country case studies to determine where anti-corruption funds are being used 
and comparing the results to expected outcomes based on the global discourse is another 
important step forward.  Interviews with Bank personnel would also clarify distinctions between 
the anti-corruption discourse and anti-corruption practices, as employees of the Bank likely have 
a better sense of the extent to which discursive shifts are being operationalized.  Any work that 
delves deeper into the World Bank’s approach to anti-corruption will serve to rigorously evaluate 
the Bank’s legitimacy beyond what this analysis could achieve. 
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